Introduction
Analyses of general equil ibrium with imperfect transactions take two different forms. The first posits a schedule of transaction costs and makes no further modifications in the Walrasian mechanism for attaining equilibrium.
(For examples, see Foley (1970) , Hahn (1971) and more recently Fischer (1982) .) The second focuses on the problem of coordinating transactions, rather than upon their costs. Studies of search equilibria (e.g., Diamond ( , 1984 , Mortensen (1982a, b) , Weibull (1982) ) are examples of this second approach.
This paper continues the exploration of transactions coordination models.
In the models discussed here, transactions occur only at meetings 2 between a buyer and seller selected at random. As in the earlier work cited above, we make the crucial simplifying assumption that individuals explore transactions opportunities one at a time.
In particular, economic presented a search model of a production economy with inventory levels restricted to and 1.
Here, we consider continuous rather than discrete levels of inventory.
The introduction of continuous inventories enables us to analyze price setting behavior.
To deal with the mathematical complexities that continuous inventories entail, we restrict ourselves to discussion of an exchange economy. An interesting feature of the analysis is the absence of the multiple equilibria that appear in the production economy. 2 We make the simplifying assumption that traders pair at random in the belief that the results of our analysis would not change significantly under a regime of systematic search, such as the one discussed by Salop (1973) .
We briefly consider matching technologies better than random ones in Section 5.
We do not consider repeat transactions.
October 17, 1983 These are linear, first-order differential equations with advanced arguments.
We seek a continuous solution F(x) such that F(0)=0, and
Given these boundary conditions, the solution is unique.
Yet the solution of (3.2a)
depends on the solution of (3.2b). Thus, we attack (3.2b) first. By using Rouche's Theorem (e.g., Titchmarsh, 1932, chapt. 3), or simply by diagramming the complex k-plane, we find that (3.3) has only one (real) root k* with negative real part. This suggests the trial solution 5
More general non-steady paths are described by a Fokker-Planck (or forward Kolmogorov) equation of the form
where f(x,t;x") is the probability that an agent with initial inventory x n has inventory x at time t, and where 0(z)=l for positive z, and 0(z)=O for z negative.
This equation is analyzed in Yell in and Diamond (1983), where we. consider the welfare consequences of an improvement in the search technology.
F(x) H(constant)exp(k*x). Making this substitution in (3.2b), we obtain
The boundary value F(y) is set by solving (3.2a) and enforcing continuity.
Reading off F(x+y) from (3.4) and substituting the result in (3.2a), v/e have the density
x<y (3.5) Integrating (3.5), the associated distribution is
where we have used F(0)=0. Setting x=y in (3.6) and using (3.3), one observes that continuity of F(x) requires l-F(y) = a/(by).
(3.7)
The quantity l-F(y) is the probability that a randomly chosen individual is not stocked out. Equation (3.7) therefore restates our scarcity assumption (3.1) in probability terms and confirms that (3.1) is required for the existence of a steady state equilbrium.
In Figure 1 , we have plotted the density F'(x). From (3.3) and (3.8), one observes that apart from an overall scale factor y, F'(x) is a one-parameter family of density functions specified by the capacity utilization ratio z=a/(by). Differentiating (3.3) with respect to z, we have
Indeed, an intuitive argument that assumes there is a steady state equilibrium leads directly to (3.7). One observes that in in a steady state, (3.7) is equivalent to the statement that the flow of goods into inventory, a, equals the expected flow of goods out of inventory, by[l-F(y)]. Equation (3.7) can also be derived formally by integrating (3.2) over the interval (0,°°).
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Equation ( If we use (3.4,5) to compute the mean inventory, we obtain x = y/2 -1/k*.
(3.9)
The term y/2 in (3.9) represents goods in process. If b were indefinitely large, an agent's inventory level would drop to zero immediately on reaching y, and the steady-state mean inventory would be y/2, as in the deterministic world of Section 2. Equation (3.9) shows that the consequence of assuming a finite transaction time is lower efficiency, manifested by a shift of mean inventory upward by -1/k* from the deterministic value. From (3.8) and (3.9) we observe that the more rapid ripening caused by a larger meeting rate b decreases average inventories, while a greater input rate of goods, a, increases average inventories.
Expected Lifetime Utility
We turn now to an evaluation of consumption patterns in terms of Yellin and Diamond (1983) 12-Using (4.2) and the homogeneity and additivi ty of the underlying stochastic process, one derives differential equations that determine W(x):
Equations (4.3) are dynamic programming relations. They equate the discount rate times expected lifetime utility to the expected flow of utility plus the expected value of capital gains from changes in inventory.
The asymptotic limit W(°°) given by (4.1) is reconfirmed on inspection of (4.3b).
In Figure 2 , we exhibit the shape of W(x), as given by (4.3).
Note the monotone increasing behavior as x increases, and also the upper bound on W that results from the scarcity condition (3.1).
For completeness, we give the explicit solution of (4.3) for W(x). If wages depend on whether inventories are above or below y, purchase and consumption by an agent with inventory between y and y+p will lower subsequent wages.
Therefore, in order to compute the equilibrium distribution of inventories, it becomes necessary to determine the set of inventory levels at which consumption opportunities are taken.
To compensate separately for labor and for inventories would introduce an interest rate into the model. In a more general model with delays in transmitting goods within the firm which are different from delays in transmitting purchasing ability, the equilibrium conditions determining inventory available for sale differ from those determining inventory available to finance purchases. On the other hand, meetings between pairs of agents may be purely random, without redirection to adequately stocked sellers.
In this case, h is the product of l-F(p) and l-F(y), and we have
It is plausible that the dependence of b on F(x) lies between these two polar extremes, with some delay in finding an adequately stocked supplier, but better than random search.
The two polar possibilities, (A,B) lead to different relationships between inventories and prices. We will now show that the more efficient technology A described by (6.3) results in mean inventory proportional to price.
On the other hand, the less efficient technology B described by (6.4) results in less than proportional growth of mean inventory as a function of price. We begin by analyzing the dependence of the distribution of inventories on the endogenous rate b. The resulting equations hold for both search technologies.
The trading rules of the firm introduced above tell us that the price p plays the role of the consumption bundle size y in the equilibrium analysis [cf. (3.2-8) ] that fixes the inventory distribution F(x).
In particular, the condition (3.7) for the continuity of F(x) tells us that the fraction <>f agents who are able to buy satisfies l-F(p) = a/(bp).
(6.5)
Replacing y by p and x by y in (3.6) and using (6.5), the fraction of the population able to sell is
[l-e k * y +k*y], (6.6) where k* is the unique real, negative root of the characteristic equation
Furthermore, from (3.8), mean inventory becomes
We shall use (6.7) to compute the change in mean inventory (6.8) --in particular in -1/k* --as p increases.
To proceed, we first eliminate the endogenous growth rate a from (6.7).
The rate of growth of inventories satisfies the firm's budget constraint. This is the requirement that wages equal profits, which here takes the form
where we have used (6.5). From (6.9), we see that the ratio a/p = a'/y (6.10) 13 is independent of price. Therefore, the real wage, On the other hand, the quantity pk* decreases monotonical ly in p, approaching a constant (negative) value for sufficiently large p.
Proof.
Lemma 1 can be confirmed analytically by substituting (6.4) and (6.6) into (6.11a), and using (6.7), deriving an implicit equation for k*: The derivative dk*/dp obtained from (6.13), k*RA[yRj -pRA]~, is negative (positive) when the derivative R~(k*p) is positive (negative). Therefore, dk*/dp is negative for p sufficiently near the zero-profit point p=y, as Lemma 1 asserts.
For sufficiently large p, the solution k*p of (6.13) occurs where R~(k*p) is negative, and dk*/dp is positive. The derivative of k*p with respect to p, k*yRj[yRj-pR,!,]~, is positive, consistent with the less than proportional growth of -1/k* anticipated above.
The dependence of k* and k*p on p is exhibited in Figure 4 .
Lemma 2. The price response of mean inventory, dx/dp = 1/2 + k*" 2 dk*/dp, (6.15)
is positive for all allowed p.
One confirms this result by differentiating (6.13). We have ? dk* R' (k*p) dp k*y Rj(k*y) -k*p R£(k*p)
(6.16)
To prove that mean inventory increases with price, we must show that k*~dk*/dp is greater than -i. From (6.15) at the zero-profit point.
one in which dk*/dp is negative. Recalling Figure 3 d(k*y) dp Since R~is convex, the sign of (6.17) is negative, and k* dk*/dp takes its lowest value at the zero-profit point p=y. From (6.13), we may write The first-order condition for profit maximization, From Section 3, we know that the right-hand tail flatten? as the capacity utilization ratio increases.
A priori, therefore, we expect that an optimal equilibrium price will exist only if the capacity utilization ratio z' does not exceed a critical maximum. As a corollary, we expect that the higher the capacity utilization ratio, the higher the equilibrium price.
The same reasoning allows us to compare equilibrium prices for the two different search technologies. We expect the more efficient technology A, associated with a shorter right-hand tail, to result in a lower equilibrium price.
Since we assume no collusion among firms, the derivative in (7.1) acts only on the inventory level and does not take account of the structural relationships between k* and z' derived in Section 6. The right hand side of (7.1) is therefore simply minus the exponential rate constant k* (cf.(3.4)), and we may write k*p = -p/(p-y).
( 7.2)
The system is in equilibrium when p satisfies (7.2), and k* simultaneously satisfies (6.11b) for technology A, or (6.12) for technology B.
By combining (7.2) with (6.11b) and (6.12) respectively, we obtain pairs of equations that relate the equilibrium price to the capacity utilization ratio z'. For technology A, we have, defining U=p/(p-y), Lemma 5. For both search technologies, the optimal price p is a monotone increasing function of the capacity utilization ratio a'/b'y.
The monotonicity of p excludes the existence of multiple equilibria characterized by different prices but the same value of z'. We show the behavior of the optimal price as a function of z' in Figure 5 . Note the singular behavior of p as z' approaches 1-1/e and also the higher equilibrium price for technology B at each value of z' --the comparative behavior anticipated above.
To derive these monotonicity properties, one may sign and bound the logarithmic derivatives of the right-hand sides of (7.3a,b) .
In the more difficult case (7.3b), we have the logarithmic derivative The bound on the right side of this inequality is negative over the relevant range U=p/(p-y)>L In sequels, we plan to study monetary models with the same structure,
as well as models incorporating interest paid on "deposits" of inventory.
In the interest models, we will introduce deaths and births, with "estates" going to the government for redistribution. This will allow us to con- Note that the derivative dx/dp is negative for p near y and positive for large p, as shown explicitly in Figure 4 . 
